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RECOVERY FOR MENTAL ANGUISH IN OHIO
Tuttle v. Meyer Dairy Products
75 Ohio L. Abs. 587, 138 N.E. 2d 429 (App. 1956)
Plaintiff purchased a carton of cottage cheese from the defendant
company. While eating some of this cheese, she bit upon a piece of glass,
which she expelled from her mouth without cutting or scratching her-
self. Plaintiff developed nausea and suffered nervousness and mental
anguish for the next few days as a result of this incident. The jury
found that the plaintiff's fright and mental anguish were the proximate
result of the defendant's negligence, and awarded the plaintiff $1500.
The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and
held that in the absence of a contemporaneous physical injury, a seller
of food is not liable for fright, apprehension or mental anguish suffered
by a purchaser who finds a foreign substance in the food.
It is generally held that mental disturbance alone is not compen-
sable1 unless caused by a willful or intentional act.2 But a multiplicity
of theories, exceptions and distinctions confuse this area of recovery when
the defendant is alleged to have been merely negligent. The "concurrent
injury" theory is followed by a minority of jurisdictions, including Ohio.'
This theory in effect requires that a physical injury, however slight, must
occur contemporaneously before any damages may be recovered for
mental disturbance.4 The majority of American jurisdictions follow the
"impact theory," which requires a mere impact, touching, or physical
contact before recovery may be had for the mental disturbance.'
The impact and concurrent injury theories provide a similar result
where there is a slight physical injury.' The distinction becomes decisive
1 Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612 (1916); Chandler v. Ill. C.R.
Co., 256 Il1. 259, 100 N.E. 152 (1912) ; Kalan v. Terra Haute & I.R. Co., 18 Ind.
App. 202, 47 N.E. 694 (1897); Buchanan v. Stout, 123 App. Div. 648, 108 N.Y.
Supp. 38 (1908) ; Annot, 56 A.L.R. 657 (1928) ; 52 AM. JUR., Torts §78 (1944)
15 AM. JUR., Damages §175 (1938).
2 Wright v. Beardsley, 146 Wash. 16, 89 Pac. 172 (1907) ; 15 AM. JUR.,
Damages §179 (1938).
3 Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W.R. Co., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908);
Davis v. Cleveland R. Co., 135 Ohio St. 401, 21 N.E. 2d 169 (1939); Bartow v.
Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E. 2d 735 (1948) ; Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115,
170 N.E. 869 (1930).
4 Block v. Pascucci, 111 Conn. 58, 149 At]. 210 (1930) ; Morton v. Stack,
su pra note 3.
5 Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N.E. 737 (1902);
Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) ; Smith v. Montclair Brown
& White Cab Co., 6 N.J. Misc. 57, 139 At. 904 (Sup. Ct. 1928) ; Clark Restaurant
v. Rau, 41 Ohio App. 23, 179 N.E. 196 (1931).
6 Clark Restaurant v. Rau, supra note 5. Plaintiff swallowed a particle of
glass in food served by defendant which passed safely out of his body, though
causing mental stress and anxiety. The court said, "this fact itself establishes an
injury even though there be no other injury."
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in cases where the "injury" is little more than a technical touching.'
Underlying both theories is a realization of the difficulty of proving
(or disproving) the existence of an injury as intangible as fright or
mental disturbance. The difficulty of proof, raising the fear of false
and fraudulent claims, apparently leads the courts to require physical
contact or injury as a means of providing some assurance of validity to
the claim.' In cases where this assurance must ,be actual physical injury,'
the question arises whether the impact is injury per se. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, faced with this question, apparently
strained to impute an injurious character to a mere impact in order to
allow recovery.
10
The court in the instant case based its decision on the concurrent
injury theory, first enuniciated in Ohio in Miller v. Railroad Co." and
followed in Daus v. Cleveland Ry. Co. 2 In the Miller case, the plain-
tiff was frightened when a train fell onto her property near where she
was standing; there was neither physical injury nor impact.
The authority relied upon in Miller cannot ,be regarded as adequate
support for the concurient injury rule since there was no impact of any
sort in two of the cases.13 A third case had already been overruled,' 4
and a fourth case involved an intervening proximate cause.' 5 One com-
mon and distinctively significant element of the remaining cases cited is
that they did not involve impact or personal contact of any kind.
7 Porter v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 At. 860 (Sup. Ct.
1906) (dust in the eye) ; Smith v. Montclair Brown & White Cab Co., supra
note 5, (shaking-up of plaintiff in an automobile); Homans v. Boston Elevated
Ry. Co., supra note 5, (slight jolt) ; Comstock v. Wilson, supra note 5 (slight
physical impact accompanied by shock).
8 PROssER, ToP.rs §37, p. 178-180, (2d ed. 1955).
9 Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W. R. Co., supra note 3.
10 Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., supra note 5, where the court referred
to the negligent jolting received by plaintiff as "a battery, notwithstanding the
absence of intent. It then concluded that the fright and the battery concurred in
producing the disability, thereby making it unnecessary to determine which was
the actual cause; also see note 6, supra.
1178 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908).
12 135 Ohio St. 401, 21 N.E. 2d 169 (1939).
13 Smith v. Railway Co., 23 Ohio St. 10 (1872), plaintiff was ejected from
defendant's train and sought recovery for insult and embarrassment. Morton v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 53 Ohio St. 431, 41 N.W. 689, (1895), involved
failure of defendant's company to deliver a death message to plaintiff. Today,
such circumstances provide a basis for recovery in many jurisdictions; Mentzer v.
Western Union Telegraph Co. 93 Iowa 752, 62 N.W. 1 (1895); Gillespie v.
Brooklyn Heights Ry. Co., 178 N.Y. 347, 70 N.E. 857 (1904); Annot., 23 A.L.R.
361, 372 (1923).
14Victorian Ry's Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888), had
been overruled in its own jurisdiction by Dalieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669
(1901), prior to the time the Miller court cited it.
15 Scheffer v. Washington City, V. M. & J.S.R.R., 105 U. S. 249 (1882). The
intervening insanity of plaintiff broke the proximity chain between the original
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In the Davis case, Judge Zimmerman speaking for the Court dis-
cussed the Miller case in these terms:
The rule in the Miller case has been recognized as the law of
Ohio for more than thirty years and is supported by abundant
and respectable authority. A majority of the present members
of the court, being mindful of the doctrine of stare decisis,
are of the view that it should not now be overruled.1"
A closer consideration of the authority supporting Miler should
perhaps have softened the Court's strict adherence to stare decisis in
affirming this restrictive rule of recovery. 17 In the present case, the
court cited Wolfe v. Great . & P Tea Co.18 which held that when the
plaintiff became nauseous from eating peaches from a can after noticing
worms in the syrup, the question of whether or not a physical injury
occurred was a question of fact for the jury. The instant Court, by
making the questionable distinction that if all the glass were removed
from the carton of cheese, the cheese would become perfectly edible,
removed the question of injury from the jury's consideration.
There are, however, 'broader grounds for reconsidering the current
Ohio rule on mental anguish. The human abnormality which the courts
term "mental injury" has definite physiological effects and in one sense
is a "physical injury."' 9 It is established law that a peaceful mental
state is entitled to protection.2" The protection of peace of mind is the
stated or tacit basis for allowing recovery for invasion of privacy, assault,
malicious prosecution, defamation, false arrest, and certain nuisances.
This invasion of mental quietude as a distinct and separate aspect of legal
liability is significant in light of this analysis of legal history:
The treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic factor
belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A
factor which is today recognized as parasitic will . tomorrow
fright and his subsequent death. Also cited was Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Trott,
86 Tex. 412, 25 S.W. 419 (1894) and it is worth noting that althought recovery
was denied, Texas was one of the first jurisdictions to allow recovery for mental
damages without physical injury; Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
16 135 Ohio St. 401-407; 2 N.E. 2d 169-172 (1939).
17In both Davis v. Cleveland Ry. Co., supra note 3, and Bartow v. Smith
supra note 3, Judge Zimmerman disputed that part of the Miller rule which denies
recovery for subsequent physical injuries. Also, in the Bartow case, Judge Hart
expresses strong dissent and clearly suggests that many courts are taking the more
modern view in allowing recovery more frequently without contemporaneous
physical injury.
is 143 Ohio St. 643, 56 N.E. 2d 230 (1944).
19 Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MIcH. L. REv. 497
(1921-22) ; Bohlen and Polikoff, Liability in New York for the Physical Con-
sequences of Emotional Disturbance, 32 CoL. L. REv. 409 (1932), and Liability in
Pennsylvania for the Physical Effects of Fright, go U. PA. L. REv. 627 (1932);
PROSSER, TORTs §56 2d ed. (1955); Ellison, Recovery for Mental Suffering in
Louisiana, 15 LA. L. REv. 451 (1954-55).
20
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §47(b) (1939).
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be recognized as an independant basis of liability.2 1
As stated initially, mental harm alone is compensable when caused
intentionally; why, then, distinguish the injury on the 'basis of the defend-
ant's action? If the court is concerned with proof and corroboration,
there appears to be no valid basis upon which to distinguish negligently
caused mental harm and intentionally caused mental harm.
Recovery for "pain and suffering" is not an insignificant element of
damages in the ordinary personal injury case. If the courts feel that they
have sufficient means to control the amount of recovery for this variety
of mental disturbance, what valid line of judicial control distinguishes
recovery for mental injury alone? The absence of a precise pecuniary
standard (such as market value) in measuring pain and suffering in a
simple negligence case or in a case of intentional mental injury is ap-
parently no longer troublesome.
The difficulty of proving mental disturbance without any physical
injury or impact affords little reason for denying the opportunity to
make such proof.2" When recovery is denied for reasons of expediency
or simplicity, we may be observing "a pitiful confession of incompetence
on the part of courts of justice." 2" The Supreme Court of Wisconsin,
in a recent decision allowing recovery for, mental disturbance wtithout
impact under circumstances nearly identical with the Miller case, stated:
The courts are getting away from the requirement of physical
impact to sustain liability in fright and shock cases, and the
majority no longer require impact, while those courts which
retain the impact requirement go very far in finding sufficient
impact from the most trivial contact.2"
A similar ruling was recently handed down by the Arizona Supreme
Court.26
The principal case represents a questionable application of the ex-
treme rule enunciated in the Miller case. The present Ohio court need
not have adopted the liberal "no impact" rule to have sustained the jury
verdict in the instant case. The need for progress in this area of the law
should be evident. The present Ohio rule, resting on doubtful authority,
denying meritorious claims, and forcing irrational distinctions does not
comport with the present day conceptions of the extent of legal protection
which should be afforded the individual.
Peter P. Rosato
21 STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY, 470 (1906).
22 Brent v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. (1927).
23 It should be noted that the plaintiff in the instant case won in the trial
court.
24 Simone v. R.I. Co., 28 R.I., 186, 195, 66 Atd. 202, 206 (1907) ; Chinchiolo v.
New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 Atd. 540 (1930).
25 Colla v. Mandella, 85 N.W. 2d 345, 347 (Wis. 1957).
26 Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 317 P. 2d 1094 (Ariz. 1957).
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